Michigan Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 3

1953

ADMIRALTY-VALIDITY OF "BORN-TO-BLAME" CLAUSE IN BILL OF
LADING
Richard B. Barnett S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Admiralty Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard B. Barnett S.Ed., ADMIRALTY-VALIDITY OF "BORN-TO-BLAME" CLAUSE IN BILL OF LADING, 51
MICH. L. REV. 430 (1953).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol51/iss3/8

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

430

M1cHIGAN

[ Vol. 51

LAw RBvmw

RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-VALIDITY

oF "Born-To-BLAME" CLAUSE

IN

BILL oF

LADING--

Petitioner is owner of the S.S. Nathaniel Bacon which collided with the Esso
Belgium damaging both ships. The cargo of the Bacon, owned by respondents,
was also damaged. The collision was caused by the negligent navigation of employees of both ships. The bill of lading issued to respondents contained a
"both-to-blame" clause requiring the cargo owners to indemnify the carrier for
any cargo loss indirectly borne by the carrier. This action was brought to determine liability for the damages suffered in the collision. Held, on appeal, the
''both-to-blame" clause is invalid because of public policy prohibiting carriers
from stipulating against their own negligence, and hence the cargo loss must
be borne by the carrier as well as the ship with which it collides. United States
v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 236, 72 S.Ct. 666 (1952).
The Harter Act1 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act2 have relieved the
carrier ship from liability to the cargo owner for damages caused by negligent
navigation or management of the vessel. Thus, where only the carrier ship is at
fault, cargo loss falls on the cargo owner. If, however, a collision occurs as a
result of mutual fault of both ships, the cargo owner has an action against the
non-carrier ship for the full amount of his damages. 3 Under the rule recognized in the United States4 in a mutual fault case, the total collision damagesincluding the cargo damage paid by the non-carrier ship-are shared equally
by the two colliding ships.5 The ship suffering the greater damages has a claim
against the other ship for an amount necessary to equalize the burden. Thus,
the carrier ship indirectly pays one-half the damages to her own cargo when
both ships are at fault, while she is relieved entirely of liability when solely at
fault. The ''both-to-blame" clause inserted in bills of lading represents the carriers' attempt to correct this "anomaly"6 contractually by requiring that in

127 Stat. L. 445, §3 (1893), 46 U.S.C. (1946) §192.
2 "(2) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising
or resulting from-(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants
of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship." Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, 49 Stat. L. 1207 at 1210, §4(2)(a) (1936), 46 U.S.C. (1946) §l304(2)(a).
The earlier Harter Act provided for relief from liability for such negligence only where the
owner had exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. The Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act eliminates this condition.
SThe Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540, 19 S.Ct. 491 (1899). Prior to passage of the
Harter Act the cargo owner could pursue either ship for his full damages. The Atlas, 93
U.S. 302 (1876).
4 Nations that have ratified the Collision Convention of 1910 operate under the rule
that damages borne by each vessel shall be "in proportion to the degree in which each
vessel was in fault." See CoLINVAUX, CARVER'S CARRIAGE OF Goons BY SEA 1004 (1952).
5The North Star, 106 U.S. 17, I S.Ct. 41 (1882). The passage of the Harter Act
had no effect on this rule. The Chattahoochee, supra note 3.
6 "This curious anomaly, that the carrier pays more if his navigators are half at fault
than if they are solely at fault, has long been a source of friction. The practical effect is
that, whenever a collision is held to be the fault of both ships, the cargo underwriters
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mutual fault cases the cargo owner will indemnify the carrier ship for that
share of the cargo damage which would otherwise fall on the carrier through
operation of the split of damages rule. 7 Under such a provision, the cargo owner
recovers his full damages from the non-carrier ship, the non-carrier ship recovers one-half this amount from the carrier ship under the split of damages
rule, and the carrier ship recovers this amount from the cargo owner. The loss
would thus be shared by the cargo owner and the non-carrier ship, the carrier
ship being relieved of liability here just as it is by statute where solely at fault. 8
The validity of the clause was attacked by the cargo owners in this action on
the ground that public policy will not permit common carriers to stipulate for
immunity from their own or their agents' negligence. 9 The position of the
shipowners was that passage of the Harter Act relieving the shipowners from
liability for negligent. navigation and management of the vessel was a congressional pronouncement of public policy contrary to that previously laid down
by the courts, and that there could no longer be objection on these grounds
to the "both-to-blame" stipulation. The Supreme Court had already accepted
such an argument when in The Jason 10 it upheld the validity of a clause providing that cargo owners should be liable to pay general average11 even when
recoup half their losses (subject, of course, to limitation of liability provisions) from the
shipowner's protection and indemnity_ underwriters." KNAUTH, OcBAN BILLS OF LADING
158 (1941).
7 "If the ship comes into collision with another ship as a result of the negligence of
the other ship and any act, neglect or default of the Master, mariner, pilot or the servants
of the Carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship, the owners of the goods
carried hereunder will indemnify the Carrier against all loss or liability to the other or noncarrying ship or her owners in so far as such loss or liability represents loss of, or damage
to, or any claim whatsoever of the owners of said goods, paid or payable by the other or
non-carrying ship or her owners to the owners of said goods and set-off, recouped or recovered by the other or non-carrying ship or her owners as part of their claim against the
carrying ship or carrier." United States v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 236
at 238, n. 5, 72 S.Ct. 666 (1952).
s "In Canada, Great Britain, and in fact throughout Europe and also in Japan, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, the uniform rule is that cargo recovers from 'the other
ship' the proportionate part of its loss corresponding to the degree of fault of the other ship
as determined by the court in the collision suit, and 'the other ship' does not add this
element of loss to its other items of damages to be divided with the carrier ship. This
striking difference between the law of the United States and the law of the other shipping
nations has sometimes led shipowners to adopt extraordinary precautions to avoid being
sued in the United States; and has also given rise to some remarkable efforts to maintain
suits in the United States in order to gain the advantage of the American rule." KNAUTH,
OcBAN BxLLs OF LADING 158 (1941).
9 Prior to passage of the Harter Act, the courts held that an attempt by the carrier to
relieve itself of liability for negligence of its servants or agents was an unjust and unreasonable attempt by the carrier to abandon the essential duties of its employment. Hence such
clauses were held void as against public policy. Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v.
Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 9 S.Ct. 469 (1889).
10 225 U.S. 32, 32 S.Ct. 560 (1912).
11 Where a whole maritime venture is, without fault, in danger, and a part of the
venture is deliberately sacrificed for the salvation of the whole, the owner of the sacrificed
portion is entitled to contribution from the owners of the surviving portion of the venture.
ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 764 (1939).

432

MrcHIGAN LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 51

the danger necessitating the sacrifice of ship or cargo arose because of negligence
in the navigation or management of the ship. The Court felt that passage of
the Harter Act removed any public policy objections to such a clause. 12 This
reasoning was followed by the district court in upholding the "both-to-blame"
clause; 13 however, the decision was reversed in the court of appeals14 in a
ruling affirmed by the Supreme Court in the principal case on the grounds
that without more specific congressional authorization carriers could not deviate
from the rule prohibiting stipulations against liability for negligence. Thus,
unless there is a statutory change, shipowners will continue to be free from liability when solely at fault, but subject to indirect payment of 50 per cent of
the damages when partially at fault. It is submitted that Congress should act
to correct this result.
Richard B. Barnett, S.Ed.

12 225 U.S. 32 at 55, 32 S.Ct. 560 (1912).
1s United States v. The Esso Belgium, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 836.
14 United States v. Farr Sugar Corp., (2d Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 370.

